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Introduction 
Managerial compensation is an important part of the corporate policy and corporate 
governance decisions. It is also relevant to HR practices and overall strategic management of the 
firm, as the compensation is seen to be one of the primary motivational factors. Shareholders 
want to maximize their wealth and in order to do that they need to compensate employees in a 
manner that will maximize the value of a company. 
In scientific research there is a known so-called agency problem, which relates to the 
situation where managers and shareholders maximize their own wealth, but the ways to achieve 
those goals for managers and shareholders may be different. Compensation structure for 
management has important implications on how they will do their job, their motivation to 
achieve strategic targets and the alignment of their work and goals with those of shareholders, 
what kind of projects they are going to undertake. Therefore, shareholders have to create such a 
compensation package for top-management that will be beneficial for both groups. 
The structure of managerial compensation evolved over time. Back in the day the 
managers, who were overseeing the work of others, only received salary. Then an idea of a 
bonus, which is given for achieving some results that are set before the managers, came to the 
business world. The new governance mechanism was set as so managers would get more money 
if they reach certain goals, be it profit or any other indicator of performance. The problem with 
this method of compensation seems obvious.  
First of all, the chosen metric should be the one that is directly concerned with the 
activities of the said manager, otherwise the managers would not be receptive to this kind of 
compensation.  
Secondly, managers can seek to inflate any metric to receive bigger bonus. The senior 
management is not a life-time position, so the manager might decide to undertake projects or 
certain activities that boost short-term position of the company, while compromising it in the 
long-run.  
As the financial science and the business practices evolved more and more mechanisms 
to compensate managers came to live. Stock options and other long-term incentive plans are 
supposed to help fight short-termism in the minds of managers and truly make them work for the 
prosperity of the company.  
Nowadays, there are also golden parachutes, retirement and severance pay for the top-
management. The golden parachutes became the target of public outcry during the crisis, because 
general public didn’t really understand the idea behind large sums of money paid to the 
management in the event of contract termination. While the golden parachute was not only a 
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simple compensational tool, but also a way to keep firm free of unfriendly takeover, it still is an 
incentive for the manager to look at the company more objectively.  
The research of managerial compensation and its link with firm performance is an 
integral part of financial scientific community. As time goes on, we can see the effect of time-
decay of the empirical studies that are done in this domain. Clearly, the executive compensation 
evolves year to year, so the older research may not be applicable to today’s world. We have to 
look at this problem with a fresh set of eyes, because there are practical implications of 
understanding the link between managerial compensation and firm’s performance.  
 The research in this area suggests that different data sets may provide different results, 
and researchers provided the scientific communities with polarized results in this area. Clearly, 
the time-decay effect, because of which the data can become a little bit obsolete, makes grounds 
for further research. 
 Corporate world always changes and evolves. As business and managerial science 
becomes more advanced, there are created more mechanisms to control business processes and 
practices inside the corporation.  
 Managerial compensation is too a subject of ever-happening change. 
 Raging debates regarding managerial compensation are still heard both in academic 
world and in public domain. Despite intensive research in this area, there are still many questions 
that beg to be answered. For example, what is the industry influence on managerial 
compensation in times of upturn and downturn? It can be argued that managerial compensation 
simply reflects overall better position of the industry, rather than ability of CEO to expose any 
effect on firm’s value.  
 The structure of managerial compensation remains to be an actual topic of research, as 
the new ways of compensation emerge. There are performance awards, options with different 
vesting periods, unrestricted stock awards, severance pay and other forms of compensation that 
might influence managerial behavior. And maybe the core question is not about specific form of 
compensation (vetted vs. not vetted options), but rather about tying compensation to equity, 
almost with no regard to the form of this equity-based package. It is also possible to study this 
problem from many different approaches, including psychology, sociology, finance and other 
(i.e. motivational aspects).  
 There are possible interferences in the process of constructing managerial compensation. 
For example, there is a situation when company acquires new CEO. How is it reflected in 
compensation and firm’s performance?  
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 All those questions and problems are integral to understanding the bigger question: how 
do boards of directors could efficiently construct managerial compensation (assuming that they 
are interested in growth of firm’s value, which is required by duty of loyalty, i.e., they should put 
corporate interests first)? 
 We can’t list each question about this research domain that remains unanswered or under 
researched, but hopefully we made a clear picture of the possible advancements in this domain.  
 This master’s thesis is concerned with looking at the link between structure of managerial 
compensation and firm’s performance, and aimed at answering the question: is there a link 
between executive compensation and company’s performance? Subsequently, we will study the 
structure of managerial compensation and its link to firm’s performance. 
 The objectives, hereby, are: 
1. To theoretically study the problem in depth, outlining research in this field that was 
already performed 
2. To represent current trends in managerial compensation and to present this data in clear 
format 
3. To find suitable way to measure market and accounting firm’s performance 
4. To perform an empirical study and explore the link between firm’s performance and 
managerial compensation 
5. To find a link between different structures of managerial compensation and firm’s 
performance 
6. To compose a managerial implications arising from our research 
 
We should also note possible limitations to this research area. 
First of all, we may not be able to find the data for executives’ compensation for every 
country or industry. It is quite obvious, yet still must be addressed. In the US, the public 
companies are obliged by law to disclose all information regarding executives’ compensation to 
the SEC. There are enough data to study biggest corporations, originating in the US. In many 
developing nations, our ability to gather the data on compensation is limited to questionnaires 
and surveys, and the companies may not want to share this kind of data with general public or 
even scientific researchers. 
 This problem would be addressed by sticking to the data of US companies, which happily 
provide this kind of information. We can access this data by using databases of Thomson Reuters 
One.  
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 Secondly, the measurement of firm’s performance (both market and book) requires 
vigorous examination. There are, indeed, ways to assess those kinds of performance, but we 
should know better than just follow in the footsteps of others.  
 This means, that we would need to look at what and why researchers used in their 
research as a metric that measures firm’s performance. 
Further, we need to analyze and find out general trends in executives’ compensation in 
the recent years, see its evolution and what situation there is now. While we are generally 
speaking about firm’s performance, we would still need to use specific measures that accurately 
represent firms’ position in market and book sense.  
 Theoretical evolution of the field will slowly slide into empirical research, which would 
be based on regression analysis. Using available datasets for compensation and performance, we 
would need to create a model that gives crystal clear understanding of the problem. 
While the question of the study is pretty straightforward (if we for a moment disregard 
the need of theoretical overview of compensation), the practical implications of solving this kind 
of problem should contribute to the actual situations in the modern business settings. 
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Chapter I. State of the art of managerial compensation and firm’s 
performance 
1.1 Theoretical problem 
This research heavily relies on Agency theory, which suggests, when applied to the research 
area of this thesis, that goals of the manager and shareholders may not be aligned. Manager, 
understandably, is concerned with maximizing his own wealth, while shareholders are concerned 
with their wealth.  
 To dive a little bit further in the Agency problem, we turn our attention for the 
background of this problem, its roots and consequences. Managers and shareholders have 
different goals, which may arise because of a multitude of factors, i.e., different risk-preferences 
of those two groups. Thus, investors could have diversified portfolios of companies and can 
quickly change their portfolio, given their understanding of risk and returns of specific 
companies, while top management of any given company is concerned with corporate and 
business problems, goals and activities for this specific company. Managers may have different 
attitude towards risk, and by default be incentivized to keep their job. 
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) in their work mention, that those differences in goals and 
their misalignment could be controlled by controlling activities, which may be too costly (and 
resource-demanding too) to implement in reality. Information asymmetry, different kinds of 
uncertainties contribute to the problem of monitoring and controlling of executives.  
 This situation becomes even more prominent in companies with dispersed shareholders. 
If there are many shareholders present, a big part of them may not have an incentive to be the 
leading force in monitoring the executives’ activities and decisions. Thus, top management 
becomes even more influential, while shareholders have less power and control over firm’s 
activities. Even in the firms with strong boards of directors, problems may arise, which is evident 
in the case of Enron. 
Essentially, there is a different tool that comes to minimize agency problem – 
compensation package, which aligns the goals of shareholders and managers. The point is not to 
pay more than everyone does, but rather construct such a compensation package, which 
incentivizes managers to achieve shareholders’ goals. Equity-based compensation may be just 
the right tool to do that.  
The problem occurs when those goals are not aligned enough. The judging criteria for a 
managerial performance varies by firm. Companies use different metrics and KPI to assess, 
whether executives’ decisions are actually contributing to maximization of value of the firm 
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(and, thereby, wealth of the shareholders). It is not an easy task to assess value of decisions of 
any given manager, especially if the shareholders are concerned with long-term value.  
 Sometimes, manager’s contribution to the firm assessed every quarter, so any big project, 
while in long-term may provide firm with extremely good opportunities, may ruin his assessment 
short-term. This might make manager opt for decisions that make him receive the bigger bonus, 
regardless of how good his or her decisions are for the long-term prosperity of a firm. It is 
debatable, what kind of “success” shareholders want to see from the managers (some may not 
look long-term), but the problem becomes only more complicated with this notion. 
 In the early 1970s economists were concerned with researching risk, risk-based decisions 
and attitudes towards taking the risks. A great amount of research was done in the field of 
economics (Arrow, 1971) about this topic. The research in this field sheds a light on problems 
which occur when different parties have different orientations towards taking risks. 
 In a sense, agency theory was a continuator of this research, as it was reviewing the 
problems which arise when different parties in cooperating setting have different goals (Ross, 
1973).  
 Agency theory is aimed at understanding the specific relationship, which occurs when 
principal delegates some work functions to the agent, who has a responsibility to perform given 
tasks. This problem is also called principal-agent problem. 
 Some scholars (Eisenhardt, 1989) describe agency theory as a way to understand and 
resolve two problems that arise from this specific relationship: 1) goals of those two parties; 2) 
difficultness of verifying the actions of agent by principal. 
 To resolve the conflict, goals should be understood. Agency theory suggests that both 
parties simply want to maximize their own wealth. The second part of the conflict relates to the 
situation, when shareholders do not possess enough power to actually verify what the agent is 
doing and whether his decisions are aligned with shareholders’ goals. It is especially important 
for the companies with dispersed shareholders, who might not have strong stimuli to perform 
controlling functions or who might not have enough power individually to verify managers’ 
performance.  
 Managers are exposed to different investment opportunities, which might be forfeited, if 
they are, for example, too risky. Shareholders simply do not have any way to know whether this 
opportunity even arisen. Thus, the information asymmetry makes the problem even more 
prominent. 
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It is generally understood that to solve agency problem, one should strive to align 
managerial goals with goals of the shareholders, effectively monitor managerial decisions and 
reduce information asymmetry. It is important to note that out of those 3 options, monitoring and 
reducing asymmetry may not always be a viable option, and even if they are, it is a very 
resource-intensive process. Thus, alignment of goals of managers and shareholders comes into 
spotlight as a possibly the most efficient and least resource-intensive option out of those. 
 One of the ways to minimize the effects of agency problem is to construct such a 
compensation package that it will effectively monitor manager to maximize shareholders’ 
wealth, which, in turn, will maximize his (or her) own wealth too.  
The general basis for understanding the problem of link between managerial compensation and 
firm’s performance in our research generally lies in regression analysis. Further, we will discuss 
model specifications with chosen variables.  
 Our idea was to see the link not between the amounts of compensation, which could vary 
for different reasons and also related to firm’s size, but rather between structure of managerial 
compensation and performance. 
 1.2 Literature overview 
As we have already mentioned, there are numerous articles about executive compensation 
and firm’s performance. Some researchers tend to look at a bigger picture, analyzing mostly the 
biggest corporations which share the data on executive pay as to comply with SEC regulations 
on the documentation of public companies. Currently, many countries demand from public 
corporations to disclose information on managerial performance.  
Other researchers try to understand developing or lagging markets. Their approach to the 
problem may vary, including use of surveys to assess the data of companies that choose to share 
it. Lack of transparency in the developing markets limits the ability to study this problem, 
although some of the authors try to do assessments based on voluntary reports. The markets 
though, evolve, and countries adopt regulations, which aimed at making more financial 
information available to the potential investors, including the data on managerial compensation. 
In our overview we will look at both theoretical foundations of the problems, and also 
introduce the reader to the empirical research, which was done in recent years in many countries 
around the globe.  
Figure 1 illustrates the most important factors of the research that are taken into account, 
when trying to understand the link, which we assess in our research.  
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Figure 1. Structure of the research domains 
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companies became managed by professional managers, who were raised and taught in business 
schools or by other means of achieving knowledge and skills that are required to lead an 
organization.  
This constitutes a change in the role of owner or owners in organization. In other words, 
ownership and control became separated. It should be noted that owners might choose to lead 
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is one).  
Owners, who lead their respective organizations, are something that is typical for new 
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organization, and many others. Therefore, a board of directors is the entity that is concerned with 
appointing a manager.  
Regardless of the organization, if owners and managers are different entities, each of 
them will be concerned with maximizing their wealth. Thus, the agency problem, also known as 
principal-agent problem, arises.  
It is debatable, whether the concerns of those two entities are actually aligned, and when 
one maximizes their wealth, the other does, too, or not, but the literature suggests that the 
problem exists.  
Not everyone in scientific literature, though, sees this as a solution to the agency 
problem; some (Blanchard, Lopezde-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1994) believe that it may be a part of 
the agency problem. Those scholars recognized that some of the pay packages are designed to 
maximize managerial rent-seeking, and not to provide incentives to align goals of shareholders 
and managers. This, indeed, may be true, especially with weak boards of directors or when the 
CEO him- or herself is an appointed member of board of directors. This is another direction for 
the research. 
Talking about agency problem and alignment of goals, it is only natural to touch upon 
risk and risk preferences of individuals, which are integral part of our problem. The scientific 
literature treats top-managers as a risk-averse individuals. Harris and Raviv (1979) say that 
executives would like to receive pay for their work in such a way that its amount wouldn’t 
depend on performance. That is, the managers do not want to take any risk, which can undercut 
the amount of money they receive.  
This suggests that top managers would prefer a simple financial transaction, cash, every 
month for their efforts, and would probably oppose an idea of receiving payments that are based 
on equity.  
As we have already mentioned, this is probably lies in direct alignment with an idea of 
certain things that beyond managerial control, as stock returns may not directly be influenced by 
the managerial decisions. 
The research was done in 1979, when overall understanding of strategy, business world 
and the development of managerial compensation was still under way. But, if anything, this 
research paints executives as a risk-averse individuals, who prefer to receive same amount of 
money every month without any dependence on their performance.  
After so many years, we have an absolutely different kind of personalities, leading the 
organizations, and also absolutely different circumstances, in which they operate.  
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Does their risk-averse preference have any influence on organizational performance? 
Let’s now, for a minute, consider that managers are, in fact, risk-averse. 
A risk-averse manager will seek to minimize personal risk, which from the viewpoint of 
corporation also means that he will seek to minimize project’s or firm’s risk (Amihud and Lev, 
1981). In certain situations risk-minimization may be a viable tactic, but using it as a general 
approach might negatively influence shareholders’ value. 
The notion of whether an average manager is risk-averse, risk-neutral, risk-seeking (or 
somewhere inbetween) is an important consideration for owners as to understand what kind of 
compensation should they offer. 
We also need to look at how shareholders are seen in the eyes of scientific community. A 
lot of researchers generally consider shareholders as a risk-neutral entity, because they have the 
ability to diversify their portfolio, essentially diversifying risk for any given firm. It should also 
be noted that shareholders might understand that managers are risk-averse. 
In a sense, shareholders would like managers to be more risky in certain situations, so the 
idea of equity-based compensation quickly springs to mind.  
We shall also address presupposed assumption in the text above about general 
understanding of managers being risk-averse and investors being risk-neutral. For any given 
individual manager, investor, fund or any other institution, this may be different. But as much 
research shows, managers are indeed oriented at bearing as minimal personal risk as possible, 
unless incentivized otherwise. Investors, on the other hand, are able to diversify their portfolio, 
meaning that they are risk-neutral if we look at them from portfolio perspective and also assume 
that markets are efficient. 
In following subchapters we will further study the research that was done in markets 
other than US. Developing countries are vastly different from developed countries, and 
companies may have big distinctions as well. Different legal, political and economic 
environment may affect all the things we undergone to research in this thesis. Though we shall 
note that researching developing countries may be hard because of the amount of disclosure 
available, generally higher fluctuations in companies’ activities and many other factors. 
Grossman and Hart (1983) suggest that executives are motivated to bear more risk and 
make value-maximizing decisions, if their compensation is directly tied to company’s 
performance.  
The authors above conform to our notion that incentivizing managers might be a viable 
solution for making them bear more personal risk. Although “value-maximizing” decisions are 
defined broadly, we might conclude that it means that managers start to look out for 
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opportunities that raise market valuation and operational performance of a company. Under 
efficient market hypothesis allows us to make an assumption that market valuation is fair to the 
company’s future, not only its short-term profits.  
Hirshleifer and Suh (1992) suggest that compensation packages based on equity make 
executive more risk-tolerant. It should be noted, though, that if there are effective monitoring 
institutions (outside board of directors or “big” lenders), then option-based incentives provide 
less effect. Their conclusion coincides with that of Mehran.  
When looking at agency problem and the possible ways to reduce misalignment of goals 
of managers and owners, it is definitely noteworthy to take into account other factors than 
managerial compensation.  
Effective boards of directors with independent directors or outside strong monitoring 
institutions may provide some effect on making executives more risk-tolerant. It is still unclear, 
whether being more risk-tolerant equals better alignment of managerial goals with those of 
investors. After all, monitoring institutions or strong board of directors may force executives 
make a decision or fire them, but does it mean that the strategy of the given executive will 
change?  
Frye (2004) mentions growing information asymmetry, which happens when firm’s 
investment opportunities grow. Shareholders cannot directly observe and analyze said 
opportunities, as those only available for the eyes of the management of the company.  
Information asymmetry is a known and well-understood factor of agency problems, so, 
given those assumptions are true, shareholders need a way of counter-acting this problem.  
The board of directors is a suitable entity to somewhat limit the bad effects of information 
asymmetry, but even they can’t monitor each and every possible project. In certain companies 
the history also draws a grim picture of a board of directors not actually being independent or fit 
to “manage the managers”. The well-known case of Enron is not only an example of 
mischievous accounting practices, crisis in California, but also an ineffective board of directors, 
which should’ve been more strict with the CEO and his plans.  
Transactional costs associated with this problem can rise significantly, and while board of 
directors might be a fine solution, there are also risks and limitations involved.  
Another contribution by Frye (2004) that is worth mentioning is the relationship between 
firm size and use of equity-based compensation. As we have already mentioned, equity-based 
pay is more effective (we’d argue that even required), when it is hard to control managers for 
various reasons. Frye asserts that a company size is positively related to equity-based 
compensation, which supports our position on board of directors and information asymmetry. 
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It can be hard to distinguish between smaller and bigger organization, and we can 
measure this difference with more than one methodology. Even if firm size is related to equity-
based pay, it is possible that smaller firms typically place more value on employees, rather than 
processes, and thus this relationship captures the value of an employee to organization.  
Another point to be made when carefully analyzing firm size and equity-based pay is that 
smaller companies can be immature in comparison to bigger companies with established 
practices and diversified business portfolio. 
Mehran (1995) notes that outside directors are more efficient in using equity-based 
compensation for top-management, and the use of equity-based compensation is correlated with 
firm’s performance. Interestingly, Mehran also mentions that overall structure of the board of 
directors is not related to the firm’s performance, although in firms with outside blockholders 
there is less equity-based compensation used, which might support abovementioned notion of 
“monitoring” executives instead of compensating them based on equity.  
Outside independent directors are less involved with top executives, and can make their 
judgments based solely on their expectations. Inside directors, on the other hand, might be more 
involved with strategic efforts of the firm, thus making them not the most effective entities to 
design executives’ package.  
 Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) found that that weaker corporate governance leads 
to bigger agency problems, which, in turn, negatively affect the performance of a firm. 
 Authors of this article were able to show that CEO compensation is bigger when he (or 
she) is also the board chair, and/or when board of directors is large, and/or when the board of 
directors is large, and/or when board of directors constitutes of older people who server on more 
than 3 different boards. Weak corporate governance means that shareholders are ineffectively 
represented, which gives top management more leeway in his or her actions.  
This only supports our previous notion of strong boards being better at constructing pay 
packages for executives. 
Authors succeeded in showing that CEOs received bigger pay when there was weaker 
corporate governance in the firm. Furthermore, authors assessed how this bigger pay is 
connected to firm’s operational and market performance. They were quick to find that excess pay 
indicates negative association with both operational and market performance.   
In a sense, the role of board of directors only becomes even more prominent. Not only 
strong boards allow for better compensation (and subsequent motivation) for the managers, but 
they also can save money for shareholders.  
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Sometimes managers might be rewarded not for their skill, but simply for luck. Bertrand 
and Mullainathan (2001) believe that so-called ‘pay-for-lack’ is another dimension of agency 
problem. Pay-for-lack, simply put, is when managers receive better compensation for something 
that is not under their control, i.e., when the whole industry is booming and companies in this 
industry enjoy prosperity. However, that may not be a manifestation of “luck”, but rather an 
ability of the company in booming industry pay more for talent.  
Constructing the compensation package already looks like an awfully hard thing to do. 
Companies need functional boards of directors to do that, and they have to understand 
information asymmetry, industry conditions and many other things. But there is a light…  
Sloan (1993) writes that for shareholders it is optimal to use equity-based incentives in 
managerial compensation packages (though, the level of compensation should be approximately 
the same in the end), but it is not practical to tie whole compensation on equity.  
Although the exact measurements of how much equity-based compensation should be 
given to the managers is not really the main point of our research, Sloan’s study shows a clear 
way of an alignment of owners and managers. We will look at the relationship between equity-
based compensation and firm’s performance in later sub-chapter more in-depth.  
Managers might have different vision of what they want to do with organization and 
goals (and means of achievement) for the organization from the shareholders. Clearly, owners 
would like to interfere with this thought process and demand managers to increase the wealth of 
the shareholders. But the demands itself don’t look a good way to achieve this result.  
The better way for shareholders to maximize their own wealth may lie in maximizing 
managers’ wealth through equity based compensation. If the organization performs well (from 
the point of view of investors), then the manager should be rewarded. A simple, yet powerful 
idea of reciprocity based on actual performance and results.  
The devil is, as always, in the details. The measurements of performance, surely, exist. 
Investors could either look at market indicators, accounting indicators, or both.  
The time horizon for those indicators may differ, and managers might be pressured into 
performing well on quarter-to-quarter basis, as opposed to achieving long-term goals, especially 
with many independent financial institutions giving ratings and review for companies on 
quarterly basis.  
The problem with indicators is not single dimensional, though, because one might argue 
that certain indicators are either unrepresentative of managerial capabilities, or can be easily 
manipulated, or both.  
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We will explore different ways of assessing firm’s performance later. Let’s now go back 
at a possible solution to agency problem within a context of managers and owners. With the 
understanding of agency problem at hand we might turn our eye to empirical research in various 
countries. We will look whether the notions introduced in this sub-chapter holds true for 
companies in all regions 
1.2.2 Empirical evidence in the previous research 
 Executives in today’s companies are the people who receive the biggest salaries in the 
company, either through cash, bonuses, equity or other forms of compensation. The recent crises 
created a turmoil of attention towards the practices of the firms to pay big sums of cash to 
managers. The question that is often heard from general public is whether executives actually 
contribute more than other workers.  
 The nature of the relationship between firm’s performance and managerial compensation 
can be hard to grasp. Our role is to explore this relationship in macro view, as to whether it 
actually exists, and if it does, where is it most prominent.  
 Before we go on with exploring what current research suggests about the problem, we 
have to understand certain differences in terms of CEO compensation in different parts of the 
world.  
 China is an exemplary country where the ownership of public companies is more 
concentrated that, say, in US. This situation can be explained through both cultural and political 
factors.  
 Firms in developing countries might lag behind the firms in developed countries in terms 
of certain practices, including compensation. Rivalry between firms in some developing 
countries might be still low (as well as used strategies in those companies), which would make 
good executives a key to good performance.  
 There is also a movement in today’s world regarding maximum relative compensation. It 
is proposed that executives should receive a maximum compensation that equals minimum wage 
in the company multiplied by some factor. Currently this type of limitation is not enforced 
anywhere, but some companies may engage in this kind of policy by their own choice.  
 We shall see whether there is a relationship between managerial compensation and firm’s 
performance not only in US, but in other countries as well.  
Mehran (1995) analyzed 153 randomly selected manufacturing companies in 1979-1980 
time period in the US. His empirical analysis suggests that compensation based on incentives is 
an advantage for the firm. His other contribution in the cited work is that it is not level of 
compensation that plays part in motivation of executives, but the form of compensation. The 
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results show that company’s performance was positively related to the amount (relatively) of 
equity and the overall percentage of pay that is based on equity in executive’s hands. 
 A positive relationship between managerial compensation and firm’s performance in the 
research above is an interesting result that gets us to explore the field further.  
Frye (2004) studied the effects of equity-based compensation on firm performance. The 
researcher notes that as time goes on, more firms tend to engage in equity-based compensation 
for employees. The results of the research suggest that there is a statistically significant positive 
link between firm’s performance (market metric) and the relative amount (in percentage) of 
equity-based employee pay. The accounting metrics provided different results for two data sets 
(there were two: earlier sample suggests positive link, while later sample clearly indicates lower 
returns in terms of book values). 
Jeppson, Smith and Stone (2009) took the data for 200 public US companies that reported 
the data for SEC. In this research managerial compensation was only analyzed as total 
compensation without any regard to its structure. For firm performance authors used different 
proxies, i.e., revenue, year-to-year change in net income and year-to-year change in total 
shareholder return. 
 Authors found no relationship between managerial compensation and firm performance. 
The only exception was for total revenue but even in this case, r
2 
was only 0.1, which doesn’t 
really explain much of the connection between pay and revenue.  
The research didn’t find links between managerial compensation and firm’s performance, 
which is a rare but important result. It makes us at least question the nature of the relationship, 
and further puzzles whether it actually exists. Of course, we should remember that they looked 
only at total compensation, which aggregates all the forms, and the nature of this relationship 
could be different from relationship between certain components of compensation with 
performance.  
 Most of the research on the US firms points out that the link between executive 
compensation and company’s performance exists and it is positive. There are, certainly, studies 
that do not conform to this notion, but there aren’t much of them. Generally, use of equity-based 
compensation is positively associated with market and accounting returns, even when measured 
by different indicators or in different industries.  
 Let’s now turn our attention to other countries, both developed and developing. 
Matolcsy and Wright (2011) also notice an interesting effect regarding firm’s 
performance and managerial compensation. Their work, which studied Australian firms (overall 
data sample consists from 3770 firm years), not only analyzes the relationship between 
21 
 
company’s performance and pay, but also considers the effects of the firm’s characteristics. 
Their empirical research suggests that the executive’s pay composition should be aligned with 
the firm’s characteristics. That is, equity-based incentives are effective for the bigger companies 
(which are indicated by having larger market-to-book ratio and more subsidiaries), while smaller 
companies may be better off with straightforward incentives to managers. 
Australia is a developed country with strong corporate culture, which somewhat reflects 
that of US, and the relationship held here. Though, there are interesting implications based on 
differences with US that we should consider. Options are not tax-deductible in Australia and 
more costly to establish as a part of compensation, so firms might not want to establish this. And, 
according to authors, they shouldn’t if their firm is small.  
The findings by those authors lie actually in alignment with our thoughts about 
importance of human capital and compensation. Smaller companies tend to put bigger emphasis 
on the human capital, and executives typically have more freedom of action, yet are monitored 
more closely. There is less information asymmetry (which we were writing about in the previous 
sub-chapter), so owners or boards of directors have easier time controlling how managers make 
decisions regarding the projects. 
Evidence from Finnish firms is aligned with that of other countries. Ikaheimo, Kallunki, 
Moilanen and Schiehll (2013) analyzed performance-based incentives and their link to firm’s 
performance in Finnish industrial sector (7820 firm years captured in the data sample). The 
authors of the research only wanted to see whether overall performance-based compensation 
influences future profitability of the firm, so they didn’t dissect the data into components (cash 
and various forms of equity). ROA was used as a firm’s performance indicator. 
Europe is notoriously different from United States of America in terms of workplace 
practices and corporate culture. The culture of the country has a big part in the way business is 
done, and some of the most vocal critics of the “corporate greed” are located in Europe.  
Despite all the cultural differences, the overall relationship between firm’s performance 
and managerial compensation still stands. Research on Finnish firms also shed a light on future 
value of the company (t+1), rather than simply relation of performance with awards in the same 
year.   
Ozkan (2011) found positive link between total CEO compensation and firm’s 
performance (measured by Tobin’s Q) in non-financial UK firms (data sample consists of 390 
firms – 2304 firm years in total). Additionally, Ozkan mentions not only increase in firm’s 
performance aligned with increase in cash (salary + bonus) CEO compensation, but also 
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subsequent increase in shareholder’s wealth. Additionally, author looked at link between equity 
granted to management and shareholder’s wealth, where positive link was also found.  
Some of the previous research was elevating the idea of equity-based compensation, 
while simultaneously downplaying the idea of cash payments. Cash is seen as a tool that is not as 
effective as equity-based compensation. The reason is simple – equity ties payments to the 
results of the company, while cash does not. In this study of UK firms cash was positively linked 
to firm’s performance, implying that, possibly, there are more than one way to effectively 
manage the managers. 
Another evidence in support of relationship between firm’s performance and executive 
pay comes from studies done on Chinese companies. The political, economic and business 
climate is vastly different in China, yet the  
Conyon and He (2011) noted that there is a positive link between executive pay and 
firm’s performance. This work deserves attention because it was done on China’s public firms 
and their comparison with USA firms. The paper also shows that there is a significant difference 
in the amount of managerial compensation (salaries and bonuses) between USA and China firms. 
Those are independent even after controlling for economic and government factors. 
Authors confirmed positive link between firm’s performance and managerial 
compensation independently for both cash incentives and equity grants. For the latter, there was 
no distinction between various forms of equity, rather an aggregate amount of it in the hands of 
the managers. 
It is also should be noted that ownership in China’s firms is highly concentrated. It is 
pretty often when there is one large shareholder which controls most of the equity of a firm. This 
stands in a bright contrast with western companies, in which ownership rights are mostly 
dispersed between many shareholders. In this case, agency theory predicts that there are very low 
incentives for individual shareholders to invest into monitoring of key corporate decisions. Even 
so, large shareholders typically become either an efficient monitoring entity, which can partly 
substitute for equity-based compensation. 
Buck, Liu, Skovoroda (2008) support this research with similar data and analysis. 
Institutional and cultural environment in which Chinese companies operate produced the same 
results in terms of managerial compensation and firm’s performance, which might suggest that 
this relationship is universal across globe.  
This research didn’t take into account equity-based compensation, and used average cash 
payments to the executives as a way to assess managerial compensation. The individual data was 
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not available to the researchers, and some other forms of compensation could obscure the data 
further.  
Chinese business culture and environment was and still is a developing place. The state 
interference into business process seem to on the slight decline, but the hand of the government 
still can be seen in various forms. Managerial compensation lies somewhat in the sphere of 
control of the government, and certainly there are other ways Chinese government can influence 
executives of those firms. 
Despite all those facts, more and more research in China independently vows for the 
positive link between compensation and performance.   
There also is a positive link between managerial compensation and change in 
shareholder’s wealth in Indian companies, as shown by Bhattacherjee, Jairam and Shanker 
(1998). While the research was carried out 18 years ago, when India was in much worse shape 
than it is now, the results are telling. Business practices at this time were only developing in 
India, and capital markets in the country were underdeveloped in comparison to western world.  
There are two important things to consider in assessing this research. Firstly, firm 
performance was measured by only accounting profits, and not any market metrics. This is 
reasonable, as capital markets were clearly underdeveloped in India in 1998, and their valuation 
could be just as random as it would be in, say, North Korea. Secondly, managerial compensation 
was assessed only by total cash paid to managers, excluding everything that is concerned to 
equity. This is also reasonable, as the dominating factor in the structure of managerial 
compensation in India at this time was cash. And equity was rather gimmick, than a common 
practice.  
Under all those factors, the positive relationship was found. 
Ramaswamy, Veliyath, and Gomes (2000) also conclude that managerial compensation is 
positively linked to firm’s performance in India. They used ROA as firm’s performance metric 
and total compensation for CEOs. Because of certain legal practices in India concerned with 
financial data disclosure, it was not possible for the researchers to have a distinction between 
structure of managerial compensation.  
India, a developing country, in a very turbulent period of its existence, growing at a 
steady pace, exhibits the same patterns in relationship between managerial performance and 
firm’s performance. India is a diverse country with a very different culture from the western 
countries, yet the relationship holds.  
Kato, Kim and Lee (2006) noted the positive link between compensation and 
performance for South Korean firms. To assess this link they took data on total cash payments to 
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the managers; firm’s performance was measured by Rate of Return and ROA. They also used a 
dummy-variable to see whether existence of stock option plan (around 9% of all analyzed 
contracts) in the compensation package is significant for performance by itself. It wasn’t, but 
South Korea at that time wasn’t particularly keen on using equity-based compensation.  
Compensation is one of the greatest motivational factors, and while surveys report how 
much employees enjoy certain activities, trainings, culture, organizational structure, prestige and 
other factors, compensation still leads the way in terms of setting those employees on a path of 
achieving results for shareholders. 
The general attitude towards link between performance and compensation leans toward 
the effectiveness of equity-based compensation, whatever form it takes.  
Table 1. Overview of previous empirical research 
Author(s) Object(s) Relationship Indicators used 
Mehran (1995) US: 153 randomly selected 
manufacturing companies 
Positive link between 
equity based-
compensation and firm’s 
performance 
Tobin’s Q 
ROA 
Frye (2004) US: 121 (first sample) and 
212 (second sample) 
public US companies 
traded on 
NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX 
Significant positive 
relationship between 
Equity-based 
compensation and firm’s 
performance in first 
sample; 
Mixed result for second 
sample  
Tobin’s Q (in year 
following equity granted) 
ROA 
Jeppson, Smith and Stone 
(2009) 
US: 200 randomly selected 
public companies 
No relationship between 
compensation and firm’s 
performance 
Revenue 
YTY change in Net 
Income 
YTY change in total 
shareholder return 
Matolcsy and Wright 
(2011) 
Australia: 3770 firm years Positive relationship 
between equity-based 
compensation and 
managerial compensation 
for bigger firms; Negative 
for smaller 
ROA 
ROE 
Percentage change of 
market value adjusted for 
dividends 
Percentage change of 
market value adjusted for 
dividends and risk 
Conyon and He (2011) China: 1342 domestically Positive relationship Annualized stock return 
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traded firms with 5928 
firm years 
between managerial 
compensation and firm’s 
performance 
over twelve years (SHR) 
ROA 
Buck, Liu, and Skovoroda 
(2008) 
China: 601 domestically 
traded firms 
Positive link between 
managerial compensation 
and firm’s performance 
Shareholder value 
Total shareholder return 
Pre-tax profit 
ROA 
Bhattacherjee, Jairam and 
Shanker (1998) 
India: 237 firms Positive link between 
managerial compensation 
and change in 
shareholder’s wealth; no 
link between 
compensation and profit 
Profit after taxes 
Shareholder’s wealth 
Ramaswamy, Veliyath and 
Gomes (2000) 
India: Top 150 firms Positive link between 
managerial compensation 
and firm’s performance 
ROA 
Kato, Kim and Lee (2006) South Korea: 246 public 
Korean firms (1998-2001) 
Positive link between cash 
compensation and firm’s 
performance; no 
significant relationship 
between existence of stock 
option and performance 
Rate of Return 
ROA 
Ikaheimo, Kallunki, 
Moilanen and Schiehll 
(2013) 
Finland: 7820 firm-years 
(2002-2011) 
Significant positive link 
between compensation and 
future firm’s profitability 
ROA 
Ozkan (2011) UK: 390 non-financial 
firms with 2304 firm-years 
(1999-2005) 
Positive link between 
firm’s performance and 
total cash compensation, 
shareholder’s wealth and 
total cash compensation 
Tobin’s Q 
Rate of return on common 
stock 
 
 
1.2.3 The development and the structure of managerial compensation 
 Traditionally, employee compensation revolved around salary, which was simply paid in 
exchange for some labor, some functions that he or she performed. Executives, if we can call 
them this, were too employees, who received cash for performing his duties. 
 In the XIX century, which we take from early onset of business development practices, 
managers didn’t need to be incentivized to perform better than they did. It is worth mentioning, 
that at this point in time separation of ownership and control wasn’t a commonplace occurrence. 
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As the business evolved, professionals managers became necessary, first at operational level, and 
as separation of ownership and control developed, at top management level. It was generally 
very desirable to get this position, compensation was fair for this level of employment, and, 
what’s much more important, there was no pressure to grow or get better for corporations at the 
start of its history. Moreover, at this time most owners were the top managers themselves, 
leading the way. 
 Low competition, no real understanding of business strategy and the simple need to meet 
the customer’s demand didn’t call for additional incentives or compensation.  
 As competition grew, so more owners were more and more concerned with keeping their 
employees incentivized to do better, than the competitors. Mostly top management was awarded 
with bonuses, if they met a certain target, overcome it or owners thought that executives worked 
with rigor. A real system of compensation was yet to be born. 
 Post World War II American economy enjoyed prosperity because of many economic 
and social factors. Corporations grew at a steady pace, and academics became formulating 
strategy and managerial science. Understanding of the value and role of human capital grew 
along with it. Although managerial strategy in the beginning was mostly concerned with 
processes, many still believed that it’s people who implement this strategy and who actually get 
things done. 
 Along with cash executives started to receive both short-term and long-term incentives. It 
was then a question of how owners should judge managerial performance. Incentives are great, 
but an owner must understand what exactly it is he want to invoke in a given manager. Work 
ethic and rigor is not something the owner could realistically measure objectively. It then became 
obvious that executives should be rewarded if their company grew, outperformed competitors or 
simply met certain goals and targets, achievement of which helped organization become better 
and made shareholders wealthier.  
 With the rising importance of finance, financial markets and capital of the firm, more and 
more financial instruments arisen. Those instruments were primarily aimed at investors and 
financial markets, but with their growing use and overall knowledge about them, they became a 
possible solution to align efforts and goals of executives, who at this time were already seen as 
an entity concerned with their own wealth, with those of shareholders.  
 In this time more ways of compensating managers became prominent. Retirement 
contributions, premium life insurances, use of corporate aircraft and other became a way to 
motivate manager to stay in the firm for a long time to guarantee his or her financial prosperity. 
Golden parachutes, concerned with rewarding executives after being sacked after takeover, 
27 
 
became more used and recently were under fire of main-stream media, who didn’t understand 
goal of this form of compensation.  
 Today’s package mostly consists of base salary, bonuses and equity-based incentives as a 
main compensation, and also premium health care and other benefits.  
Let’s now consider typical equity-based incentives for illustrative purposes.  
As we have already mentioned, the primary goal of equity-based incentive programs is to 
align goals of managers with those of shareholders, as well as help executives accumulate 
wealth.  
Long-term incentive programs that are concerned with equity might have tax 
consequences different that those of traditional salary or bonuses (that depends on the country 
and the form of long-term compensation).  
Before offering stock to public, the company may have a right of first refusal, and also 
right to repurchase issued stock under the compensation package, if the manager terminates 
employment with the company. Those two features are not intrinsic (although used by default 
mostly) to the equity-based plan, and might be negotiated. 
There is often another provision for public owned companies, which requires 
shareholders’ approval on exercise of an option or payment. 
 Let’s first list main forms of long-term incentives: 
 Nonqualified stock option 
 Incentive stock option 
 Stock appreciation right 
 Restricted stock awards 
 Others 
Nonqualified stock option means that an employee is granted an option to buy company’s 
stock at a predetermined exercise price. The exercise period for such option is defined by the 
agreement, and the typical length is 10 years. Important consideration with NSO is vesting 
period, which can be designed on the basis of simply time or some contributions (performance) 
of the option-holder. Typically, an agreement includes a clause by which an employee loses the 
right to exercise an option on termination of employment. 
Incentive stock option means that an employee has a right to buy stock at a predetermined 
price. An important consideration for ISO is that they can only be granted to an inside employee 
(no outside consultants, who can be granted NSOs). There are some limitations in design of the 
ISOs, and the exercise period can’t exceed ten years. ISO is an effective and popular incentive 
strategy because it grants an employee tax benefits.  
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Stock appreciation right is the contract under which its holder has the right to get an 
amount equal to the appreciation in the value of a fixed number of shares. SAR can be paid in 
cash or with firm’s stock, but it is generally better to receive it in stock, because of favorable 
taxes.  
Restricted stock means that an executive is awarded with some amount of shares but with 
certain restrictions. Typically, restricted stock contracts disallow transfer of the share and creates 
a risk of losing those shares for a disclosed amount of time. Termination of the contract means 
that shares are returned to the firm, and there is vesting period.  
Restricted stock units means that an employee is rewarded with hypothetical amount of 
shares. After predetermined period of time, the executive is entitled to get an amount equal to the 
value of his or her hypothetical amount of shares. An employee may additionally get 
compensation for dividends, which would have been paid, if those shares were actual, and not 
hypothetical.  
Performance shares are typically paid as stock units after some predetermined goal is 
achieved by a manager. More and more often, as Mercer mentions in their report, companies 
adopt this type of incentive and tie it to total shareholder return. 
Those are main equity-based compensation packages that a company might use. 
Obviously, lots of modifications to them can be made, and some more equity-based incentives 
do exist. It’s not practical to describe each and every one, as our goal is to give understanding 
what is equity-based compensation. 
Many of those options have a vesting period, and the reward itself might be cancelled if 
employee is terminated. This should help manager start seeing their working situation as a long-
term, as they have to work for some time (or deliver good performance in the long-run), and do 
everything they can to help the firm grow and maximize shareholders’ wealth.  
 All those things played an interesting role in shaping the relationship between managers 
and owners, and we turn our eye at how they are placed in modern world. 
Latest Mercer report (2015) on executive remuneration notices that shareholders across 
the globe are trying to make their voices heard, and they want to exert more influence on 
compensation decisions.  
In Europe there is a growing support for the movement that would require a binding vote 
on pay. Currently Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands, Italy (for financial services) and UK have 
a binding vote mandates, but more countries are looking into legislation that is concerned with 
this problem. US, China, Japan, Australia and few other countries have a non-binding vote to 
pay.  
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A non-binding vote that rejects a proposal might undermine the reputation of the 
company, the manager and the board of directors, which might become a problem down the road 
in the markets, passing bad signals about financial position of the company.   
Although stronger influence of shareholders might be a desirable result for them, it’s not 
guaranteed that any of those measures will actually yield results in terms of ability to control and 
monitor manager more efficiently. A growing support for say-on-pay movement may be 
somewhat explained by some of the criticisms, aimed at the ineffective boards of directors, who 
fail to fulfill their duty to shareholders.  
Mercer (2015) estimates that most of the companies adopted incentive plans based on 
Total Shareholder Return (TSR is a total return received by the shareholder; in short, can be 
calculated as capital gain plus dividends to the investor), but there is a growing sentiment about 
possible downfalls of this measure. Some believe that it is not the best indicator to base 
managerial incentives.  
The main benefit of TSR is the ability to compare performance of stocks, even if 
dividend policy is different and they exhibit different growth. TSR is a simple metric that is tied 
to shareholders’ wealth and, in theory, should put managers on the path to achieve wealth-
maximization for shareholders. But Transaction Advisers (2015) found that the more diverse 
portfolio is, the harder it is to generate a high TSR, so it might not objectively reflect the skill or 
influence of the executives. TSR might also lag behind for three and more years. And while 
incentives that are tied to TSR are typically at least three years long, the longer lag would be 
unfairly reflected in the compensation. 
According to Mercer, companies across the globe show the trend of increasing the base 
salaries of about 3% on average per year for the 2012-2015 years. There is also a slight increase 
in the use of short-term incentives during those years.  
In terms of Long-term incentives, Mercer believes that a lot of companies are striving for 
simplification in the use of LTI. In Europe most companies are using just one LTI technique, 
while in US performance share plans becoming more prevalent, and stock options are still quite 
often used, but those are decreasing. Overall share options becoming much less prevalent, while 
performance-based awards and restricted stock (service based) become part of the compensation 
package more often. 
So what are the metrics that are tied to executives’ compensation? 
Mercer outlined top-4 metrics, to which short-term managerial performance bonuses are 
tied (companies with over $5bln in revenue): Annual Sales (used in 38% of cases), Operating 
Income (36%), Internal Financial (26%) and Earnings Per Share (21%). Typically, internal 
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financial (concerned with cash flows, which many perceive to be the main part of value creation 
for the firm’s valuation) metrics are used in mature industries.  
Figure 2 shows most of the metrics, which are used by companies with more than 5 
billion dollars in revenue: 
Figure 2. Metris, which are used to tie managerial performance bonuses to, in 
organizations with over $5bln in revenues 
 
(Source: US Short-term incentive plan design survey for-profit organizations over $5B in 
revenues) 
One thing to mention is the prevalence of EPS as a metric, to which short-term 
performance bonuses are tied. Some scholars (Koller, Goedhart, Wessels, 2015) believe that this 
metric is not reflexive of whether the value is being created for the company and only leads to 
short-termism in the decisions and actions of managers.  
We can dissect executives’ compensation to three main components: salary, short-term 
incentives, long-term incentives. Base salary for executives in US firms comprises only around 
15% of total pay, while STI accounts for 20% and LTI accounts for 65%. For bigger 
corporations this ratio might be skewed even more towards LTIs. 
As Mercer estimates, in 2013 the biggest part of LTI pay for executives were 
Performance awards (up to 51% in 2013 from 41% in 2011), while RSUs and cash comprised 
only about 21%. Another 25% of the pay consisted of options, which are on a pretty severe 
decline from 2011, when they represented 35% of executives’ compensation.  
Shareholders (through boards of directors) grasp the necessity to motivate executives 
with long-term incentives, and are trying to construct the best possible package as to maximize 
their own (shareholder’s) wealth.  
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For executives of S&P100 this gap between options and performance awards is even 
wider. Managers of S&P100 companies received 56% of LTI as performance awards, 20% as 
cash and STI, and only 22% (dropped from 36% in 2011) in options. A clear trend on falling 
significance and prominence of options and their growing substitution with performance awards, 
is seen.  
Compensation packages in the recent years became much more data-driven and 
performance-oriented, and shareholders want to squeeze as much value for money as possible. It 
is characterized through growing support for say-on-pay movement, less unrestricted options and 
more prevalent awards that are tied to performance.  
Babchuk and Fried (2003) also mention certain practices that they called “stealth 
compensation”, which include pension plans, deferred compensation, post-retirement perks and 
consulting contracts. Those compensation practices can also be seen as long-term incentives, if 
they are clearly communicated to the management rather early. Consulting contracts, on the 
other hand, may arise as a parting gift to an employee, rather than a predefined condition. Some 
of those compensation practices cannot be assessed beforehand by the market or investors.  
The ability of any company to have a relationship with a manager after he or she leaves 
the company is undisputable. It is certainly possible for a company to construct such a pay 
package that evades the eyes of a public. Post-retirement consulting fees cannot be taken into 
account, and it is not even clear whether to treat them as a perk for working or a simple desire of 
a company to keep knowledgeable consultant at bay.  
 There have also been certain questionable practices, some of which are already forbidden. 
Loans below market rate for CEOs was a thing in US before legislation came through, which 
disallowed this practice. And loans can also be “forgiven”, which makes it a direct contribution 
to the wealth of the manager. Some of those practices may exist outside of US. 
1.3 Hypotheses development 
To assess how structural components of managerial compensation is linked to firm’s 
performance, we put forward certain hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1: There is no significant link between relative amount of salary (to total 
compensation) CEO gets and firm’s performance in the next year 
 The relationship between salary and subsequent performance of the firm is not that easy 
to assess. Salary is the basic component of the compensation that is perceived as something 
everyone gets, and no one really expects to perform better or worse based on salary at the level 
of top-management. On the other hand, salary is an entry-ticket that shows commitment and 
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respect for the experience and skills that CEO brings. Overall, we perceive this component to be 
rather insignificant in terms of its ability to motivate employee push themselves to achieve better 
results for the firm.  
 In this hypotheses we stand somewhat in contrast to Kato, Kim and Lee (2006) and 
Ozkan (2011), who found positive link between total cash compensation and performance. The 
reason for our hypothesis, despite having contrasting results from other researchers, lies in the 
exclusion of equity-based compensation from the model in Kato, Kim and Lee model. We assess 
that the changes in the compensation package do not reflect this positive relationship, and their 
exclusion of equity-based compensation also allows us to hypothesize about insignificance of 
cash compensation.    
Hypothesis 2: There is a significant positive link between the relative amount of Option 
Awards CEO gets and firm’s performance in the next year 
Option awards, although are less prevalent than RSAs right now, are too forward-looking, 
although when we reviewed the data, it felt like Options were used much more for the purposes 
of awarding managers for their good previous work, at the end of term and also for similar 
reasons. This observation, obviously, doesn’t hold for all companies, and many use them for 
motivational (forward-looking) purposes. We assume that, despite said differences, Option 
Awards positively linked to firm’s performance in the next year. 
Both hypotheses 2 and 3 follow into the footsteps of the previous researchers, i.e., 
Mehran (1995), Frye (2004), Matolcsy and Wright (2011), who showed empirical evidence of 
positive link between equity-based compensation and firm’s performance. We will see whether 
this notion holds.   
Hypothesis 3: There is a significant positive link between the relative amount of RSA (to 
total compensation) CEO gets and firm’s performance in the next year 
Restricted stock awards, as we have discussed already, perform different function from 
the salary altogether. RSAs are forward-looking and they bring more value to an employee, if the 
company grows. To get this bonus, employee has to achieve certain targets or wait before RSAs 
vest. Thus, managers can easily see the alignment between their own goals (wealth 
maximization) with goals of the firm. 
Hypothesis 4: Appointment of new CEO is significantly linked to firm’s performance in 
the next year 
When new CEO comes to lead the company, the dynamics of the firm, the culture, the 
strategic process and goals might change significantly in quite short time. Fresh CEO is always 
looking to raise profitability for the firm, because that’s why he came to the company in the first 
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place.  It puts enormous pressure on achieving results, at least in the first years of his or her 
tenure. This is quite a force that directly impact company’s performance, and that is what we 
hypothesize. 
 The company (through board of directors) creates a new package for CEO, based on his 
or her skills, experience, goals and other things. It is a control variable in our case, but it affects 
the way compensation is being composed, so we also include it in our research from hypotheses 
standpoint.  
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Summary of chapter 1 
 This research is concerned with understanding the link between executives’ 
compensation and firm’s performance. Scientific literature suggests that the problem exist, and a 
lot of scholars studied this area rigorously through different methodological lenses, approached 
analyzing firm’s performance in different ways and assessed the problem in different countries. 
 The agency theory, which revolves around relationship where one party gives a certain 
work functions to another part. In this relationship, the goals of those two parties (principal and 
agent) might not be aligned, which potentially creates a conflict. For an organization, an internal, 
latent conflict between shareholders and managers can be a critical situation, which prohibits 
future growth and limits investment opportunities (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Managers by default do not seek to attain to shareholders’ goals and eager to work 
towards their own goals. Shareholders, on the other hand, want their goals to be achieved. This 
creates a need for a solution, which aligns managers and shareholders. Many believe that pay 
packages are the way to do that. However, certain problems arise: weak boards of directors may 
create bad compensation packages (for shareholders), information asymmetry, and different risk 
attitudes. 
 Some scholars (Arrow, 1971) suggest that roots of the problem lie in different attitudes 
towards risk. Managers are risk-averse and do not want to undertake projects, which create a 
situation where said manager bears personal responsibility for its success. Shareholders, on the 
other, hand are risk-neutral. From this relationship arises information asymmetry, a situation 
where managers might be exposed for investment opportunities, but shareholders have no means 
to know about them. Their goals in this situation would be somewhat unattainable, if the 
mechanisms of control are not imposed. And those mechanisms might be way too complex for 
an organization. 
 Researchers (Frye, 2004; Huselid, 1995) also suggest that equity-based compensation is a 
way to expose managers to taking more risks and undertaking projects, which they might have 
forfeited without this type of compensation. Equity-based compensation can be seen as a 
potential solution to the agency problem (and the construction of optimal contract), which aligns 
goals of managers and shareholders. 
 This research is organized around learning in-depth theoretical basis for this problem, 
uncovering recent trends in executives’ compensation and empirically analyzing the relationship 
between managerial compensation and firm’s performance. 
 In the end of the chapter, we have developed four hypotheses to test in the empirical part 
of our work, based on the previous research of the problem.  
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Chapter II. Empirical research 
2.1 Methodology 
 Regression models 
To approve or disprove hypotheses, which we developed in the first part of this research, 
we use regression models in the research, which mostly differ by dependent variable (firm's 
performance), but some also differ in control variables as discussed above. 
We performed hausman test on each model to help us decide, whether we should choose 
fixed-effects or random-effects model. In each situation, it was more suitable to use random 
effects. Some also compare efficiency of the random-effects/fixed-effects models with pooled 
OLS, but there is no real basis for doing so in our research, as the pooled OLS would disregard 
that data was gathered on many different companies for multitude of years.  
Basic model 
For regression analysis we propose this model: 
                                           
Where: 
 Performancet+1 – firm’s performance; 
o Natural logarithm of market capitalization – market-based 
o Return on Assets – accounting-based 
o Tobin’s Q – mixed model 
 Xi,t – vector of variables, which reflect structural components of managerial 
compensation; 
 Yi,t – vector of control variables; 
            – vectors of unknown coefficients; 
   – random term. 
It should be noted that we use performance with one-year lag to assess how managerial 
compensation in this year is reflected in firm’s performance in the next year. Now we will 
discuss each component of this model.  
Firm’s performance 
 Measuring firm’s performance is no easy task, despite the obvious fact that there are 
numerous metrics to assess how good company is doing through accounting or market 
measurements. The problem is choosing the right metrics, as they are obviously at measuring 
different aspects of the performance. Can we truly assess and evaluate the company on the basis 
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of certain metrics, if they are measuring very specific returns and also include information that 
can be influenced by the managers or the market? 
The problem of performance measurement points us to the necessity to assess the 
company in two dimensions: market-based and accounting based. 
In this research we use three measures of firm’s performance: 
 Natural logarithm of Market Capitalizationt+1 
 Return on Assetst+1 
 Tobin’s Qt+1 
Market-based measurement 
Market-based measurements allow us to see how (in our research) structure of managerial 
compensation is linked to the way the company generates value for shareholders, as assessed by 
investors. Recently it was hotly debated topic that current way of reports on Wall-Street (i.e., 
quarterly review of the company performance) forces managers to balance short-term decisions 
with long-term decisions, which may not be the best course of action in certain situations.  
On the other hand, some researchers say that markets (especially in developed countries) 
are efficient, which means that market-based valuations are an effective way of understanding 
value of the company as a whole, as the investor have the full picture of what is going on in the 
company. While this point is debatable, and may only exist in the perfect world, many believe 
that markets are efficient to some degree. 
Regardless of those limitations, market-based measurement is a holy grail for any public 
corporation, which most often strives to grow their valuation. As it is a goal for many companies 
(and subsequently managers), than it is most definitely the right way to assess performance in 
our research. 
For market-based metrics in our research was chosen natural logarithm of market 
capitalization. This metric is standard enough to look at the growth or the fall of valuation of the 
company, and natural logarithm allows us to standardize data, simultaneously making it more 
appropriate for analysis. 
This is the primary metric of interest for those who look from the positions of investors at 
our research.  
Accounting-based measurement 
Accounting-based metrics is a different beast altogether. Companies are free to adopt 
certain practices to influence accounting measurements, which can be aimed at softly 
manipulating taxation, for example. The difference in accounting practices pose a limitation, as 
sometimes it becomes unrepresentative of real situation in company. The use of “special purpose 
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vehicles” (as in the case of Enron) may also pose a significant threat to valuation of the 
company, if it is based on accounting measures (though, market-based measurements provide no 
different insight in this case). Ability to invest or divest, to get more debt or payout debt, to 
underwrite net income, to depreciate differently and many other things influence how the 
company accounting measurements are constructed. 
Despite those obvious limitations, it is still important to look at the link between 
managerial performance and firm’s performance through the lenses of accounting performance, 
as it may provide additional insights.  
For accounting-based measurements in our research was chosen Return on Assets, which 
measures how efficiently company generates earnings by using its assets. The metric is 
somewhat limited to how company engages in asset management, but on average it is good 
enough to determine firm’s performance. 
ROA is calculated as 
          
                    
 
Another obvious limitation of ROA is that doesn’t capture forward-looking possibilities 
and mostly shows, how efficiently assets are being utilized in generating earnings. Theoretically, 
it sounds wise to measure, but practically any decision in regards to assets of the company can 
inflate or deflate the metric significantly. Management decisions are concerned with many 
different things, and some of them, while positive for the company in long-term outlook, may be 
negatively reflected in certain ratios, including ROA. It also doesn’t include any expectations 
about the future profits and projects, which somewhat limits the scope of the ratio, even if it 
describes current performance.    
Mixed measurement 
To assess our problem further, we decided to look at one more metric, Tobin’s Q, which 
some consider to be more or less market-based, while other categorize it as an accounting-based 
metric. It is not our goal to debate, whether Tobin’s Q should be considered either of those. 
Tobin’s Q is a widespread measurement of long-term firm performance (Bozec, Dia & 
Bozec, 2010). Generally it can be calculated as 
                                   
                             
, but there are 
other possible ways to approximate Tobin’s Q. For our research the above-mentioned formula 
was chosen.  
Tobin’s Q also captures market expectations of the firm, essentially showing how much 
the company valued over replacing it with the similar assets. This indication of the potential 
growth and overall market potential of the firm is important, as no company actually exists in a 
vacuum.  
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Managerial compensation 
 As we noted previously, there are different forms of managerial compensation, which 
include, but are not limited to, salary, bonus, restricted stock awards, option awards, different 
forms of long-term incentives, pension matching, certain perks (corporate jet, cars, help with 
taxes, hotels, etc), golden parachutes and many other.  
 However, the most prevalent three are salary, restricted stock awards and option awards, 
at least for our data sample (part of S&P 500 Composite, which will be discussed later on). 
Because of the fact that we need to have enough observations to make any significant claims 
about results, we decided to concentrate mostly on three variables, which are relevant to 
compensation: 
 Salary-to-total ratio (relative amount of salary)  
 RSA-to-total ratio (relative amount of restricted stock awards) 
 Options-to-total ratio (relative amount of option awards) 
During studying the problem and looking at dataset without yet done analysis, it became 
somewhat evident that those forms of compensation perform different functions in organizations 
and are popular enough to be included in the model. 
Salary is an almost mandatory form of compensation, which exists in any organization of 
our data sample. Salary is a safe base for a top manager, he will still earn it, barring any legal 
incidents that may prohibit him from doing so. 
Restricted stock awards are future-oriented, and generally they those awards are paid out 
after employee vests for a specific time period or meets performance-based goal. During vesting 
period or before achieving performance-based goal, employee gets no real value from having 
this award, but if their performance is good enough, they will get this value in the future. Thus, 
RSA seems to be a theoretically effective means of motivating employee without making him or 
her too “comfortable”. 
Option awards are less prevalent than RSA in recent years, but many companies still 
engage in granting option awards. Employee gets an opportunity to buy stock of the company in 
the future at a specified price. It is assumed that the manager will try to maximize firm’s value to 
make the option more valuable: as the price of stock rises, the value of option increases 
(difference between exercise price and stock price).  
Option awards can be seen as somewhat more risky or less valuable, because if the stock 
price falls below exercise price, than an employee gets no value. RSAs, on the other hand, will 
always have value, although it may go up or down depending on the stock performance. 
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Those three parts of compensation are the most interesting look at. They also are 
somewhat prevalent, which is important for data analysis. Many other forms of compensation 
may be specific to different companies, or simply not widespread enough to be analyzed yet.  
Salary, restricted stock awards and option awards, on the other hand, are known entities 
in the world of compensation, and their practical effect is well-assumed and hypothesized.  
Control variables 
As our problem is multifaceted, we have to consider some important control variables, 
which are not directly relevant to the managerial compensation, but rather to firm’s specific 
characteristics, such as performance or size.  
In this research we control for: 
 Firm’s size 
 Firm’s performance 
 Whether there is a new CEO (binary) 
Firm’s size 
Firm’s size is an important thing to consider, while researching firm’s performance and 
managerial compensation, because it has direct impact on the amount of compensation and also 
possible interferences in structure of compensation. We do not have problems with the size of 
compensation, as we only look at ratios, but bigger companies may employ more equity-based 
compensations as opposed to smaller firms in our sample. To control for this possible variation, 
we introduce natural logarithm of sales (or revenue) to our data model, which would 
theoretically control for different firm sizes. 
Firm’s performance 
Firm’s prior performance is an important thing to consider, as it can have direct carryover 
to performance in the subsequent periods. We will control it by introducing specific performance 
variables to our regression models: either ROA (for market-based and mixed-based models), or 
growth in sales (for accounting-based model).  
Return on Assets is calculated as (
          
            
). 
Growth in sales is calculated as  
      
        
     
Influence of new CEO in the firm 
As the company acquires new CEO or promotes one of the managers to this high role, 
new compensation package is constructed, and both the structure and size of the compensation 
can vary significantly, regardless of the firm’s performance or other company-specific 
characteristics.  
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New CEO is an important change in the company, which might drive new culture or 
altogether different view of the business itself. It may also transfer to subsequent change of the 
business practices and consequently different performance.  
We control this by adding binary variable, where “1” stands for new CEO coming into 
the position.  
2.2 Sample selection 
As our empirical research is based on regression analysis, we had to construct a data 
sample.  
  Initially we started with the index – S&P 500 Composite, from which we took certain 
sectors to include in our data sample. As our understanding of the researched problem grew, we 
were choosing which sectors to include in the final list. The index is composed of US public 
companies, who exhibit strong performance, and also includes stocks, which are perceived as a 
having good growth potential.  
The data range for the sample is fifteen years – from 2002 to 2016. 
 From 500 companies from S&P 500 Composite we decided to research 155 from 4 
sectors (NAICS classification): manufacturing, information, retail, services. Manufacturing and 
retail are two very stable sectors, while information and services sectors characterized by 
different business process and overall strategic orientations.  
 Names and SIC codes of sectors and sub-sectors: 
 Manufacturing (subset of NAICS 31-33) 
o Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing (NAICS 324) 
o Chemical Manufacturing (NAICS 325) 
o Machinery Manufacturing (NAICS 333) 
 Retail (NAICS 44-45) 
 Information (NAICS 51) 
 Professional Services (NAICS 54-56) 
o Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services (NAICS 54) 
o Management of Companies and Enterprises (NAICS 55) 
o Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services 
(NAICS 56) 
 The chosen sectors of S&P 500, despite their differences in terms of services and goods 
produced, follow the same pattern in terms of growth, which is evident through market 
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capitalization and the growth of it. Figures 3 and 4 show that all four sectors follow the same 
pattern. 
Figure 3. Average market capitalization by sector 
 
Figure 4. Average growth per year for each sector 
 
Sectors show similar trend and thus were included in our data sample. The relative 
differences in how they grew and fell are present, but the overall development of the sectors is 
quite similar.  
Services sector includes companies which produce and perform business supporting 
functions, i.e., SalesForce, and not really consulting functions as it might be suggested by the 
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name of the sector. Thus, the companies in this sector are comparable to the rest of the data 
sample. 
 From this list of 155 companies subsequently were excluded 20 companies, which were 
unrepresentative of the general practices of managerial compensation in public companies. Some 
of those companies had more than one CEO at one point in time, thus, the structural 
compensation and its link to company’s performance couldn’t be properly assessed. Other 
companies still had founders as a CEO, who set themselves salaries, which do not reflect 
practices in executives’ compensation (salary 1$ or simple fixed salaries for numerous years). 
 One of the limitations of the considered data sample is somewhat unbalanced data for 
numerous years. Not every company engages in paying managers with Restricted Stock Awards 
(RSA) or Options; some of the companies were not public (during part of the time frame we 
analyze) or even existed during all of the years, which are considered in our research.  
The sample was constructed by using Thomson Reuters Datastream and Thomson 
Reuters Eikon. Data on companies’ performance was taken from Datastream, while Eikon was 
an integral part of gathering data on executives’ compensation.  
 
2.3 Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variables in our work can be classified either as concerned with managerial 
compensation or as concerned with firm’s performance. Let’s look at table 2 firstly to quickly 
overview the descriptive statistics of the dataset at hand. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable Observations Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Salary 
(thousands) 
1556 1246.031 1075.865 784.1297 34.615 8100 
Restricted 
Stock Award 
(thousands) 
1106 5794.309 4415.11 6480.088 .628 94555.28 
Option awards 
(thousands) 
910 3843.082 2625.065   5277.202 2.315 77990.74 
Total 
compensation 
(thousands) 
1551 12041.69 9346.189 11306.42 136.341 156077.9 
ROA 1906 .0774794 .08165 .0956978 -.9799 .7906 
Sales or 1938 27088.57 8874.3 53856.26 .877 485873 
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Revenue 
(millions) 
Market 
Capitalization 
(millions) 
1886 38967.04 14375.92 64817.96 33.684 504239.6 
Tobin’s Q 1878 2.110995 1.655151 1.605236 .342236 20.70805 
Salary to total 1551 .1869845 .118758 .1843766 .0062775 1 
RSA to total 1101 .3895544 .3638934 .2087593 .0002921 .9712706 
Option awards 
to total 
905 .2901101 .2511602 .1903211 .0001057 .9460692 
Market 
Capitalization 
log 
1885 16.59754 16.48107 1.326983 10.42478 20.03856 
Sales log 1938 16.02284 15.99867 1.598388 6.776507 20.00146 
The difference in observations is explained by a multitude of factors. First of all, there 
were not enough data in Eikon databases on certain years for certain companies. Furthermore, 
not every company was public or even existed during the 15 years that we look at. The 
limitations of data were addressed in model specification.   
Salary had become less prevalent (dynamic for prevalence of Salary to total 
compensation is shown in figure 5 in next page), and most companies tend to use it in a 
compensation package less and less. It still is a safe way to earn money, but in the whole 
package of compensation it plays pretty insignificant role in recent years. As the possible ways 
to compensate managers grew, more companies leaned on paying with different forms.  
Restricted Stock Awards have gradually become the biggest part of executives’ 
compensation. The rise and fall of different forms of compensation is assessed on the figure 5, 
which show the dynamics in terms of compensation structure by years.  
Option awards at some point in time were as popular as restricted stock awards, but 
during the crisis in US was passed legislation, that undercut one of the biggest advantages of 
option awards – tax benefits. After that, Restricted stock awards became more prevalent, partly 
because they seem more beneficial to employees, partly because of legal climate.  
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Figure 5. Average relative amounts of forms of compensation 
 
Note: Companies can either use RSA, Options or both. Other parts of compensation were excluded  
It should be noted that we excluded some other components of the compensation, which 
are not used as widely as those three, including bonuses, specific benefits, perks, changes to 
pension plans, tax assistance, use of corporate cars and jets, non-specified long-term incentive 
plans and some other forms of compensation.  
We have chosen 4 sectors in our data sample: manufacturing, information, retail and 
services. We have already discussed those sectors and their specifics above. There is also a 
difference in companies’ overall size (as reflected in market capitalization; lowest is 
approximately 33 million, highest is approximately 504 billion). Those differences are addressed 
in the model specification, as it was discussed above. 
 Overall, we tried to create a balanced data sample in terms of maturity, performance and 
size of the companies. It is not an easy task, given that we started with four distinct sectors of an 
index, but overall it was possible to include similar companies in the sample. 
 Additional data on sectors could be inferred from Appendices 1, 2 and 3. The first 
appendix shows the names of the all companies, included in the data sample. Appendices 2 and 3 
show additional information in regards to similarity of the trends of the companies, included in 
the data sample.  
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2.4 Results of empirical analysis 
 As we have discussed previously, we ran three similar regression models for each way we 
measure performance. Results of those regressions are presented in the table 3 below. 
Table 3. Results of regression models 
Variable Market-based Accounting-based Mixed 
Relative Salary -1.54** -0.18** -1.705* 
Relative RSA 0.417** -0.08*** 0.710** 
Relative Options -0.152 -0.05 -0.263 
Sales log 0.448*** 0.028*** -0.331*** 
ROA -0.01 N/A 0.021*** 
Sales growth -0.013*** 0.02 -0.007 
New Ceo (binary) 0.118* 0.021** 0.047 
_cons 9.58*** -0.318* 7.2*** 
Note: the symbols *, ** and *** sign the variables significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 All three models are statistically significant (Prob > F 0.000), so we can conclude that all 
those models provide us with accurate results. 
 One of the first things that come to attention is the significance of negative link between 
relative amount of salary and firm’s performance; all three models confirm this finding, although 
on different levels of significance.  
 As we have seen from the descriptive part, the relative amount of salary to overall 
compensation is significantly lower right now than it was in early 2000s. It seems to be quite 
understood both by the practical and academic worlds that salary is not enough to motivate 
management to achieve better performance throughout the years. Salary provides a safe base to 
transfer whatever knowledge and skills manager has, but it doesn’t really provide any 
motivational force after that.  
Initially, we hypothesized that salary would be an insignificant factor, but the empirical 
result proved us wrong. The more management has a salary relative to total compensation, the 
worse performance of the company is expected. It can be explained by the fact that salary is 
“safe” compensation – it is not going to vary based on performance, so there is no incentive to 
perform better, and even an incentive to not take any risks and enjoy their cash compensation.  
 Thus, hypothesis 1, which stated that relative amount of salary to total compensation is 
insignificant, couldn’t be confirmed. 
 Next in line are option awards and we hypothesized that their effect would be similar to 
that of Restricted Stock Awards. As we discussed earlier, those two types of compensation are 
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somewhat similar in their effect: they both are forward-looking, but Option Awards are 
inherently somewhat riskier, because they only worth anything if exercise price is lower than the 
price of the stock.  
 Our model couldn’t confirm any relationship between option awards and firm’s 
performance in the next year, as all 3 models showed that this variable was insignificant to the 
regression. It can either be because of compensation-specific practices, i.e., mass transition to 
RSAs, so Options are only left in certain firms, or it can also be because of the possibility that 
companies use it a little bit differently, i.e., as an award to an employee, rather than motivational 
force.  
 Thus, Hypothesis 2 couldn’t be confirmed in our research. 
 Relative amount of Restricted Stock Awards is significant in their link to firm’s 
performance. Two models (market and mixed) show positive link to performance, while 
accounting-based model shows slightly negative link.  
 Let’s first consider findings in market and mixed models. This is somewhat predicted 
result, because we expect forward-looking motivation to be linked with performance in the next 
year of the grant. RSA always have value for an employee, even their value may go down. 
Managers are motivated to achieve set targets, without being pressured too much into shying 
away from risky opportunities (especially when RSAs are granted on the vesting, and not 
performance basis).  
 However, accounting based model (which has ROA as a dependent variable) shows 
slightly negative coefficient. Now we somewhat consider the limitations of accounting measures, 
which we talked about at the start of the chapter. Accounting measures can be influenced within 
the organization. It is possible that the result is inconclusive or can be attributed to difference in 
accounting practices or the way assets (or net income) are treated in the company.  
 The hypothesis 3 is confirmed with two models, while the third model can’t confirm it.  
 As we previously discussed, theoretically new CEO brings his or her skills and 
experience to the firm. Many of those CEOs actually possess a lot of knowledge about the 
company and industry, as it quite often happens that COO or other officer gets promoted to the 
CEO position. Two of our models show positive link between appointment of new CEO and 
firm’s performance in the next year, while mixed model (Tobin’s Q) shows no significant link at 
all. It is quite possible that new CEO works hard on improving operational performance and tries 
to optimize internal processes and assets, which can initially transfer to better accounting 
measures.  
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 Theoretically, the result could be explained by a variety of factors, and it needs more 
deep research before we actually extrapolate the result. This link, which is evident in two 
models, may be attributable both to the new vision or strategy that CEO brings (divesting 
decisions) or favorable market valuation as the company becomes “fresh”, or any other factor. 
Scope of our research doesn’t include this digging, but further research could shed more light on 
this topic. 
 Thus, Hypothesis 4 was confirmed by two models, while the third model couldn’t confirm 
it. 
2.5 Main findings 
 In this part we will try to shortly look at what we have achieved in this research and also 
assess how our results compare to the results of the other researchers in this domain. 
In this research we had explored how different components of managerial compensation 
are linked to firm’s performance. Our findings stay somewhat consistent with the recent research 
in this area, although not all of our regression models were able to confirm the findings. Let’s 
first reiterate our findings: 
1. Relative amount of salary received by CEO is negatively linked to the company’s 
performance in the next year 
There were different studies done on how cash compensation is linked to firm’s 
performance, but most of them were made with different methodology in mind, i.e., explaining 
whether compensation could be explained through performance. We stand in contrast to 
researches of Kato, Kim and Lee (2006) and Ozkan (2011), who found positive link between 
total cash compensation (salary and bonuses together) and firm’s performance. We should also 
note that besides different exploratory process, they had included various forms of compensation 
that were cash-based in this total and also viewed an amount of compensation, rather than 
relative amount of it to total compensation in the pay package. 
2. Relative amount of Option Awards received by CEO is not significant to the 
company’s performance in the next year 
Despite the obvious similarities between Option Awards and Restricted Stock Awards, 
they seem to not perform the same function in the data sample, which we studied. Option 
Awards are different, and they can have zero value for an employee, while RSAs always have 
value. Thus, in certain situations employees can somewhat predict (regardless of the accuracy of 
this prognosis), whether their option will have value in certain amount of time. This makes 
Option Awards riskier and some CEOs may even become demotivated, if they perceive that their 
48 
 
option will be worth nothing. Some peculiarities arise, if you look at the data sample, as many 
companies seem to award Option Awards almost randomly, while RSA follow a certain pattern. 
The decision-making process in companies can shed light on how those awards are structured 
and granted, scope of our research doesn’t allow us to answer this question directly.   
3. Relative amount of Restricted Stock Awards received by CEO is positively linked 
to company’s performance in the next year in Market-based and mixed models, 
and negatively linked in accounting-based model 
It is evident that there is a difference in three models, which was discussed, but shall be 
discussed again in the light of this result. It should be noted that accounting-based model, which 
uses ROA as a dependent variable, doesn’t capture forward-looking possibilities of the firm and 
is also sensitive to any increase in total assets. Other two models are either concerned with how 
much market values the company (market-based), or how investors value the company over its 
possible replacement with the similar assets. 
This is a pretty important point, as the investors might be more concerned with the value 
of the company, rather than with the accounting returns. Thus, for investors (and Boards of 
directors), RSAs can be very valuable in constructing compensation package for top executive. 
We somewhat stand in line with the research of Mehran (1995), Frye (2004), Matolcsy 
and Wright (2011), who confirm positive link between equity-based rewards and firm’s 
performance. But for our research, it is not just any equity-based compensation, but rather a very 
specific one – Restricted Stock Awards.  
4. Appointment of new CEO is positively linked to company’s performance in the 
next years in market- and accounting-based models, while mixed model found no 
significant relationship 
Appointment of new CEO means that the old compensation package is no longer 
relevant, and Board of directors need to construct a new one, which depends on the experience 
and skills, that brings the new CEO. His or her overall vision for the company may also differ 
from that of his or her predecessor, which would generally be reflected in strategic decision-
making process. 
While it is not directly relevant to the compensation, appointment of new CEO changes 
compensation practices and packages, so it is still an important thing to look at, when we 
research compensation structure and performance. Market-based and accounting-based model 
show that appointment of new CEO is positively linked to performance, which can be explained 
by favorable valuation (as the market believes that new strategic decisions will revive the 
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company’s spirit) in market case, and by changes in overall operating process in accounting 
model. Mixed model shows no significant relationship 
2.6 Theoretical and practical implications 
 This thesis has implications both from theoretical and practical standpoints. As most of 
the previous research was mostly concerned with assessing absolute values or justification of 
compensation through performance, this research shows another perspective on the studied 
problem. We believe that with the development of new compensation practices and packages, 
better disclosure forms, the problem can be further studied and analyzed in various parts of the 
world. Studying structure of compensation and its influence on performance proved to be a 
rather good way to address the problem. 
 Another possibility for further researches is to look at other countries, but current 
disclosure practices in many countries may prohibit from doing so. It would be rather efficient to 
study the problem at a bigger sample, and to compare the results for different countries, at least 
in the developed world. 
 As to managerial complications, those are defined mostly for shareholders, who want to 
maximize potential of their executives to achieve better firm’s performance.   
Based on our interpretation of the data, presented in the sample, and interpretation of the 
regression analysis, we can formulate four managerial implications of this research: 
1. Salary should be provided to the executive, but shouldn’t be perceived by the 
shareholders as a means of motivation 
2. Restricted Stock Awards is an effective tool of motivating managers to achieve 
greater firm’s performance, as assessed by the market 
3. Option Awards are not as effective as Restricted Stock Awards, and the 
preference should be given to the latter 
4. Appointment of the new CEO may give company a long-awaited boost in 
performance, which would be reflected in market valuation 
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Summary of chapter 2 
 In this chapter we proposed a model to research how compensation structure of a CEO is 
linked to firm’s performance in the next year. The research was carried out via regression 
analysis in three different models, which provided different insights in the problem. 
 We have defined firm’s performance through 3 dimensions: market-based (logarithm of 
market capital), accounting-based (Return on Assets) and mixed model (Tobin’s Q, which also 
reflects how company is being perceived by the market relative to the possible similar 
replacements of assets of the company).  
 To use our model, we constructed a data sample of the companies, which consists of 4 
sectors (information, retail, manufacturing, services) of companies in the S&P 500 Composite 
Index. Those industries, taken together, can be seen as representative of much bigger amount of 
companies, as they touch upon technologies, shopping, producing goods, offering and deploying 
new services. The data is gathered on 15 years (2002 to 2017), but not all companies have this 
much data, because some of them are new to stock market, and some were created quite recently. 
 We have also looked at trends in compensation in our data sample, which show that 
salary became relatively small part of the overall compensation package, while RSAs and Option 
Awards are on the rise.  
 The results of the analysis are mixed. We have learned that relative amount of salary in 
compensation package is negatively linked to performance; despite their similarities, Restricted 
Stock Awards and Option Awards are not the same in terms of their relation to firm’s 
performance. RSAs are significantly positively linked to performance in two models, while 
accounting-based models shows negative coefficient. Option Awards, on the hand, are not 
significant at all to performance in the next year. We have discussed those differences and the 
possible reason for accounting-based model showing negative coefficient. We have also learned 
that appointment of new CEO is significantly positive linked to performance. 
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Conclusion 
 This research is mainly concerned with finding assessing the link between structure of 
managerial compensation and firm’s performance. In the first chapter we have analyzed and 
presented theoretical foundation for the problem at hand, and also looked at empirical research 
on the topic in various parts of the world. Most of the research is pretty focused, and is 
methodologically different from this work. We have looked at the trends in the managerial 
compensation both through the lenses of Mercer’s reports and our own data sample. 
 In the empirical part of the research we have analyzed the link between structure of 
managerial compensation and firm’s performance, with latter being measured in three different 
dimensions: market-based, accounting-based and mixed (Tobin’s Q) model. We have discussed 
the differences between all those measurements of the performance, and empirically studied how 
they are connected to various components of compensation (we took cash compensation, 
Restricted stock awards and Option awards).  
 Generally, on the basis of our empirical research, relative amount of salary is negatively 
linked to performance, so it shouldn’t be primary way of motivating employees to achieve 
shareholders’ goals. Our research also wasn’t able to find any link between Option Awards and 
performance of the firm in the next year, but further research may shed light whether our notion 
stands. Currently, we believe that this form of compensation is not as effective as Restricted 
Stock Awards. Taking into account different results for compensation variables in different 
models, we believe that Restricted Stock Awards is an effective tool to, at least partially, align 
goals of managers and shareholders, as this type of compensation is positively linked to firm’s 
performance in the next year (as assessed by market and mixed (Tobin’s Q) models). Therefore, 
it might be essential for shareholders to construct a compensation package for executives that 
includes RSA through board of directors.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. List of companies by sectors 
Information Manufacturing Retail Services 
Activision Blizzard Inc Abbott Laboratories Advance Auto Parts Inc Accenture PLC 
Adobe Systems Inc AbbVie Inc AutoNation Inc Automatic Data 
Processing Inc 
AT&T Inc Air Products and 
Chemicals Inc 
Autozone Inc Biogen Inc 
CBS Corp Albemarle Corp Bed Bath & Beyond 
Inc 
CA Inc 
CenturyLink Inc Alexion 
Pharmaceuticals Inc 
Best Buy Co Inc Celgene Corp 
Charter 
Communications Inc 
Allergan plc Carmax Inc Cerner Corp 
Citrix Systems Inc Amgen Inc Costco Wholesale Corp Cognizant Technology 
Solutions Corp 
Comcast Corp Applied Materials Inc CVS Health Corp F5 Networks Inc 
Discovery 
Communications Inc 
Baker Hughes Inc Dollar General Corp Fiserv Inc 
DISH Network Corp Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Co 
Dollar Tree Inc Fluor Corp 
Electronic Arts Inc Caterpillar Inc eBay Inc Gilead Sciences Inc 
Hewlett Packard 
Enterprise Co 
CF Industries Holdings 
Inc 
Express Scripts 
Holding Co 
H & R Block Inc 
Intuit Inc Chevron Corp Foot Locker Inc Incyte Corp 
Level 3 
Communications Inc 
Church & Dwight Co 
Inc 
Home Depot Inc International Business 
Machines Corp 
Microsoft Corp Clorox Co Kohls Corp Interpublic Group of 
Companies Inc 
Netflix Inc Colgate-Palmolive Co Kroger Co Jacobs Engineering 
Group Inc 
News Corp Coty Inc L Brands Inc Nielsen Holdings PLC 
Red Hat Inc Cummins Inc Lowe's Companies Inc Omnicom Group Inc 
S&P Global Inc Deere & Co Macy's Inc Paychex Inc 
Scripps Networks 
Interactive Inc 
Dow Chemical Co O'Reilly Automotive 
Inc 
Regeneron 
Pharmaceuticals Inc 
Tegna Inc Eastman Chemical Co Ross Stores Inc Salesforce.Com Inc 
Time Warner Inc Ecolab Inc Signet Jewelers Ltd Symantec Corp 
Total System Services 
Inc 
Eli Lilly and Co Staples Inc Teradata Corp 
Twenty-First Century 
Fox Inc 
Estee Lauder 
Companies Inc 
Target Corp Verisign Inc 
Verizon 
Communications Inc 
Exxon Mobil Corp Tiffany & Co  
Viacom Inc Flowserve Corp TJX Companies Inc  
Walt Disney Co FMC Corp Walgreens Boots 
Alliance Inc 
 
Yahoo! Inc General Electric Co Wal-Mart Stores Inc  
 Hess Corp   
 Illinois Tool Works Inc   
 Ingersoll-Rand PLC   
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 International Flavors & 
Fragrances Inc 
  
 Johnson & Johnson   
 KLA-Tencor Corp   
 Lam Research Corp   
 Mallinckrodt Plc   
 Marathon Petroleum 
Corp 
  
 Merck & Co Inc   
 Mosaic Co   
 Murphy Oil Corp   
 Mylan NV   
 National Oilwell Varco 
Inc 
  
 Perrigo Company PLC   
 Pfizer Inc   
 Phillips 66   
 PPG Industries Inc   
 Praxair Inc   
 Procter & Gamble Co   
 Stanley Black & 
Decker Inc 
  
 Tesoro Corp   
 Valero Energy Corp   
 Vertex Pharmaceuticals 
Inc 
  
 Xerox Corp   
 Xylem Inc   
 Zoetis Inc   
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Appendix 2. EPS trends for chosen sectors 
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Appendix 3. Total assets trends for chosen sectors 
 
